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Abstract
At the beginning of the 20th Century, the U.S. dairy industry
was comprised of millions of small-scale operations producing for
their own or for very local consumption. By the end of the 20th
Century, the industry was dominated by large-scale producers
marketing products via large cooperatives. Improvements in
transportation, advances in animal breeding and feeding
technologies, and scale economies have allowed the industry to be
more competitive on global markets, where there is now active
international trade in dairy products. Major government programs to
support dairy farm income date back to Depression-era problems
facing the industry. Federal programs to support dairy income led to
recurring problems of overproduction. Programs initially instituted
to protect dairy producers from oligopsony power of purchasers now
have more questionable effects given industry concentration.
Increased market concentration has led to ongoing antitrust scrutiny
of the industry, while geographic concentration of production has
raised concerns over water and air pollution. At the outset of the 21st
Century, increased productivity has made the dairy industry less
reliant on government programs and more reliant on global markets.
Yet the industry faces many challenges: greater scrutiny over
greenhouse gas emissions, secular declines in milk prices and U.S.
per capita milk consumption, reduced viability of small-scale
operations, and the rise of plant-based milk substitutes. Still, dairies
and dairy products remain an important part of U.S. agriculture and
U.S. household food consumption.
I. Introduction
The U.S. dairy industry at the beginning of the 20th Century
was characterized by diffuse production and geographically
concentrated consumption.1 By the end of the century, it was
characterized by concentrated production, with nationally and
Professor, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of
Arizona.
1 See M. R. Weimer & D. P. Blayney, Landmarks in the U.S. Dairy Industry, 694
AGRIC. INFORMATION BULL. 1, 3–4 (1994). The United States Department of
Agriculture provides statistical data through the National Agricultural Statistics
Service that may be access publicly online. See generally Quick Stats, NAT’L
AGRIC. STAT. SERV., https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ (last visited February 9,
2020).
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globally diffused marketing for consumption.2 Numerous
technological advances enabled this transformation.3 The federal
and state governments have also actively intervened in U.S. dairy
markets.4 Many laws and programs enacted in response to income
and market problems facing dairy producers at the beginning of the
century and during the Great Depression remain in effect today.5 Several
critics have questioned the need for and value of such programs in
light of modern market realities. 6 For example, government
programs to raise dairy prices have led to waves of overproduction,
which led to the slaughter of dairy herds.7 As the industry became
increasingly comprised of larger-scale producers and marketing
cooperatives, it has faced ongoing antitrust scrutiny from the U.S.
Department of Justice.8 The rise of farm-level and geographical
concentration has also presented problems of air and water pollution.9
At the outset of the 21st Century, increased productivity has
made the dairy industry less reliant on government programs and
more reliant on global markets.10 Yet, the industry faces many
challenges: greater scrutiny over greenhouse gas emissions, secular
declines in milk prices and U.S. per capita milk consumption,
reduced viability of small-scale operations, and the rise in plantbased milk substitutes.11 Still, dairies and dairy products remain an
See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 5.
See id.
4 Id. at 17–18.
5 ERIC M. ERBA & ANDREW M. NOVAKOVIC, THE EVOLUTION OF MILK P RICING AND
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN DAIRY MARKETS 14 (Cornell Program on Dairy
Mkts. and Policy, EB 95-05, 1995).
6 Robert T. Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, The Pricing Policies and Goals of
Federal Milk Order Regulations: Time for Reevaluation, 23 S.D. L. REV. 662, 663
(1978).
7 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13.
8 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 674.
9 JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., PROFITS, COSTS, AND THE C HANGING S TRUCTURE
OF DAIRY FARMING 31 (U. S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Report No. 47,
2007).
10 See DANIEL A. SUMNER, DAIRY POLICY PROGRESS: COMPLETING THE MOVE TO
MARKETS 9 (2018).
11 NIGEL KEY & STACY S NEERINGER, CARBON PRICES AND THE A DOPTION OF
METHANE DIGESTERS ON DAIRY AND HOG FARMS 3–4, 8 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 16, 2011). Hyunok Lee & Daniel A.
Sumner, Dependence on Policy Revenue Poses Risks for Investments in Dairy
Digesters, 72 CAL. AGRIC. 226, 227 (2018). HAYDEN STEWART ET AL., WHY ARE
AMERICANS CONSUMING LESS FLUID MILK? A LOOK AT GENERATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN INTAKE FREQUENCY, at i (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research
Serv., Rep. No. 149, 2013). HAYDEN STEWART AND JERRY CESSNA, LIVESTOCK,
DAIRY AND POULTRY OUTLOOK: SPECIAL ARTICLE ON DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES: A
LOOK AT SALES OF COW’S MILK AND PLANT-BASED MILK ANALOGS 2 (U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., LDP-M-279 SA, 2017). JAMES M. MACDONALD
ET AL., PROFITS, COSTS, AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF DAIRY F ARMING 31 (U.
S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Report No. 47, 2007).
2
3
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important part of U.S. agriculture and U.S. household food
consumption.12
II. The U.S. Dairy Industry at the Beginning of the 20th
Century
At the beginning of the 20th Century, households produced
milk primarily for home consumption, while markets for milk were
not yet well developed.13 While most farms had cows, production
was small-scale and diffuse.14 By 1920, five million US farms had
dairy cows (compared to 54 thousand today).15 In 1930, 70% of US
farms had dairy cows, yet sale of dairy products accounted for a
relatively small share of farm household income.16 Among all farms
with cows, dairy sales accounted for more than 40% of total farm
sales on only 14%.17
The scope for marketing dairy products increased with
improvements in technology and infrastructure.18 Refrigerated tanker
cars allowed rail shipments of milk across longer distances, allowing
transportation of milk from rural areas to fast-growing urban ones.19
The introduction of trucks and improved roads gave producers
greater flexibility and control in milk shipping. 20 Production of
evaporated milk, processed cheese, and butter, which were less
perishable than fluid milk, all became more widespread.21 There was
more scope for storing and marketing these processed products over
greater distances.22 But, after World War I, European demand for those
U.S. dairy products that could be preserved and shipped more easily
dropped, leading to falling dairy prices.23
M. SWEITZER ET AL., FOOD-AT-HOME EXPENDITURES: COMPARING COMMERCIAL
HOUSEHOLD SCANNER DATA FROM IRI AND GOVERNMENT SURVEY DATA 16 (U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., TB-1946, 2017). NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ACH17-4, 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE
HIGHLIGHTS: DAIRY CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION 1 (2019),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_DairyCattle
_and_Milk_Production.pdf.
13 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1.
14 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4.
15 For historical numbers, see id. at 3. For current numbers, see Quick Stats, supra
note 1.
16 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4.
17 Id.
18 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1–2.
19 Id. at 1.
20 Id.
21 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 7–8.
22 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1 and 4.
23 Id. at 4.
12
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Moreover, many barriers remained to permit orderly
marketing of milk.24 First, farm households lacked many basic
resources: only 58% had cars, 25% had telephones, and 33% had
electricity.25 Few farms then had refrigeration.26 Fluid milk is
produced daily on dairies.27 Yet, it is highly perishable even with
refrigeration (which most farms still lacked).28 Without phones, it
was difficult for farmers to find and negotiate with buyers.29 Prices
were based on weight and butterfat content, but farmers could not
know if their milk that was shipped more distantly was being
weighed and tested fairly by milk purchasers.30 On the other side,
handlers were not assured the milk they contracted for in advance
was not soured or tainted.31
Fluid milk was bulky and difficult to transport over long
distances.32 It is also highly perishable, greatly limiting the space and
time over which it may be transported and consumed.33 In urban
centers, there were a relatively small number of large milk buyers
(called handlers) purchasing milk from a large number of small,
unorganized producers.34 This market structure gave handlers
oligopsony power to push down milk purchase prices below
competitive levels.35
To countervail this oligopsony power, dairy producers began
to organize collectively in cooperatives to bargain over the prices of
dairy products they received.36 Handlers countered this collective
action in court, arguing that such explicit cooperation by sellers
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.37 The Clayton Act of
191438 explicitly exempted non-stock agricultural associations from
antitrust laws, but did not address some of the vague wording of the
Sherman Act that left the status of cooperative marketing
Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 668–69.
MARYANNA S. SMITH & DENNIS M. ROTH, CHRONOLOGICAL LANDMARKS IN
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 63 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric. Info. Bulletin No. 425,
1990).
26 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 3.
27 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5.
28 Id.; see Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670.
29 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.; see SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5.
34 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2.
35 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670.
36 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2.
37 See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2019); see ERBA &
NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2.
38 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2019).
24
25
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associations ambiguous.39 To partially address this ambiguity,
Congress annually passed “riders” on appropriations for the
Department of Justice, prohibiting it from prosecuting cooperating
farmers.40 Dairy producers began organizing large-scale “milk
strikes” withholding milk to cities.41
To address these ongoing issues, the 1922 Capper-Volstead
Act 42 allowed farmers limited exemptions from antitrust controls of
the Clayton and Sherman Antitrust Act, allowing them to organize to
collectively set product prices.43 Passage of Capper-Volstead was
controversial at the time, with concerns that the antitrust exemption
would give dairy cooperative marketing associations too much
power to raise prices, at the expense of consumers.44 Senator Atlee
Pomerene of Ohio argued, “There is nothing in this bill to prevent a
combination of men who are dealing in food products – and I refer
to the dairymen – from getting the most exorbitant prices, and doing
so at the expense of the babes of the country.”45 Capper-Volstead
prohibited “undue price enhancement” by cooperatives, but did not
specify what constituted “undue.”46 Further, authority to monitor and
temper agricultural cooperative pricing behavior was given to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) rather than the Department
of Justice.47 USDA was perceived at the time to be more sympathetic
to farm interests (and less likely to restrict their behavior).48
In the 1930s, while court decisions restricted cooperatives
from interstate marketing of dairy products, courts tended to uphold
cooperative intrastate marketing.49 California, a major dairy state,
adopted an intrastate marketing organization in the early 1930s, which
is still in effect today.50 Despite Capper-Volstead, cooperative
marketing associations were largely unsuccessful in raising dairy
product prices, for two reasons.51 First, because milk is highly
perishable, its value falls dramatically over a short time.52 The threat
by dairies of withholding milk supplies was less credible than for
James L. Guth, Farmer Monopolies, Cooperatives, and the Intent of Congress:
Origins of the Capper-Volstead Act, 56 AGRIC. HIST. 67, 68 (1982).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–92 (2020).
43 Id.; see Guth, supra note 36, at 82.
44 Guth, supra note 36, at 75.
45 Id. at 78.
46 7 U.S.C. § 292.
47 Guth, supra note 36, at 82.
48 See id.
49 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 7.
50 Id.
51 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 5.
52 See id. at 3.
39
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more easily storable agricultural commodities.53 Second, because the
associations were voluntary, producers were not compelled to join
them, and those not in associations often sold into the urban markets
(acting as “strikebreakers”).54
In the wake of the Great Depression, the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA) was passed, giving the Secretary of
Agriculture authority to impose production controls to reduce
commodity surpluses and raise prices.55 The AAA provided for the
establishment of marketing orders.56 Unlike cooperative associations,
marketing orders had aspects of mandatory compulsion.57 Growers
within a designated region could vote on whether to form a marketing
order, with the referenda requiring a super-majority to assent.58 Once
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, however, the rules of the
order applied to all producers in the region.59 Thus, producers were no
longer able to free ride and undercut arrangements negotiated by the
order.
In 1935, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
National Industrial Recover Act was an unconstitutional delegation
of power.60 The AAA was amended in 1935 to address the Court’s
ruling, but in 1936 the Supreme Court ruled that the 1935 AAA
violated the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.61 To address
the Court’s ruling, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing and
Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), which among other things
specified the Secretary’s powers over establishment and enforcement
of marketing orders more clearly.62 The AMAA also brought all
handlers (buyer processors) in an approved marketing order area
under the authority of the order.63 Minimum prices for different types
of dairy products were set for all handlers in an order.64
See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. Swantz, Alexander. "How we came
to have federal milk marketing orders: What they are and what they do." Journal
of Dairy Science 45, no. 11 (1962): 1397-1402, at 1398.
54 Id. at 5.
55 See Paul L. Murphy, The New Deal Agricultural Program and the Constitution,
29 AGRIC. HIST. 160, 160–69 (1955).
56 Id. at 161.
57 See id. at 160–62.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935); Murphy, supra
note 51, at 160.
61 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77–78 (1936); Murphy, supra note 51, at
160–61.
62 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat.
246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Murphy, supra note
51, at 163.
63 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat.
246; see Murphy, supra note 51, at 163–64.
64 See Murphy, supra note 51, at 163.
53
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When some processors refused to pay assessments under and
order, the United States filed a complaint against them in October 27,
1938.65 The processors countered that the marketing order and the
AMAA of 1937 was unconstitutional, infringing on their Fifth
Amendment rights to due process, their property rights under the
Fourth Amendment, and on rights reserved only for states under the
Tenth Amendment.66 The District Court concurred, and the United
States appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.67 The Court upheld both
the AMAA and the Milk Order in a 5 to 4 decision, citing both
Congress’ authority to regulate economic activity through the
Interstate Commerce Clause and under its power to authorize
regulatory powers it deemed necessary, even if this granted powers
to the Executive Branch (i.e., the Secretary of Agriculture).68
The AMAA and subsequent legislation in the 1940s
solidified key aspects of U.S. dairy policy.69 These included:
• Establishment of Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMO)
across different regions and states;70 the FMMOs allowed
dairy producers to coordinate to increase their sales
revenue;71
• Government price supports for dairy products carried out by
direct government purchases of dairy products;72
• Dairy product import controls;73
• Disposal of “surplus” dairy products by channeling them to
foreign relief, the School Lunch Program, and other
outlets.74
The Steagall Amendment of 1941 established a support price
for dairy products promoted my government purchases of butter
(which could be stored).75 Under the Agricultural Act of 1949,
government purchases of dairy products to support farm income was
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 540 (1939); see 9
NEIL E. HARL & CHARLES F. CURTISS, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 70.01[3] (2007).
66 Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. at 541, 568; see HARL & CURTISS, supra
note 61, at § 70.01[3].
67 HARL & CURTISS, supra note 61, at § 70.01[3]; see Rock Royal Cooperative,
Inc., 307 U.S. at 539–41.
68 Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. at 568–71, 577–78; see HARL &
CURTISS, supra note 61, at § 70.01[3].
69 See generally SUMNER, supra note 10.
70 Id. at 8, 10.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 8–9.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 8.
65
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formalized as a central policy.76 Section 22 of the original, 1933
AMAA included provisions for import controls.77 These were first
applied with implementation of the Trade Agreements Extension Act
of 1951.78 Imported products were typically limited to 3% or less of
U.S. milk production.79 Import restrictions were another means to
maintain the government support price.80
These policies sought to address a host of problems facing
dairy farming in particular, and U.S. agriculture in general, in the
1930s. First, there were certain aspects of agriculture that led to what
was called “the farm problem.”81 Both the demand and supply of
dairy products was inelastic – both consumption and production
changed relatively little in response to changes in market prices.82
Related to this feature, small changes in consumer demand or
production could cause large fluctuations in milk prices.83 Next,
demand for dairy products was growing slowly, while technological
innovations were causing supply to increase faster.84 As production
outstripped demand, this placed downward pressure on prices.85 A
related problem was what Cochrane called the “agricultural
treadmill.”86 Farmers adopting cost-reducing technologies or
improved practices could sell at lower prices than non-adopters.87
This downward price pressure induced other operators to adopt costcutting technologies and practices in order to survive in the market.88
This, in turn, increased supply further, starting another cycle of price
reductions.89
Id.
Id. at 9.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See id.
81 John M. Crespi & Richard J. Sexton,
Concurrence, Coopératives de Producteurs et Marketing Orders aux États-Unis
[Competition, U.S. Farmer Cooperatives, and Marketing Orders], 277–78
ÉCONOMIE RURALE 135, 135 (2003) (Fr.), English translation available in
RESEARCHGATE, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289527129_CrespiSexton-EconRurale-ENGLISH; Bruce L. Gardner, Changing Economic
Perspectives on the Farm Problem, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 62, 62 (1992).
82 Gardner, supra note 77, at 63.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 WILLARD W. COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH AND REALITY 96–97 (1958).
87 See id. at 95.
88 Id. at 96.
89 Id. at 95.
76
77
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Marketing orders and dairy cooperatives were also supposed
to address the oligopsony power of milk handlers.90 Collective action
by dairy producers was intended to provide countervailing power to
such buyer market power.91 Economic theory suggests that buyers
who exercise oligopsony power restrict purchases and lower prices
for the inputs they purchase.92 In the case of milk, this would lead to
lower prices dairies received for milk and lower volumes of milk
purchased.93 This latter would also reduce the supply of milk
available to final consumers.94 Theory also suggests that if sellers
coordinate action in this type of market, they can increase both the
price they receive and sales.95 This raises both overall economic
welfare and benefits final milk consumers because greater
production lowers consumer prices.96 While the 1937 Act established
programs to raise dairy farm income, policies to raise farm prices
were to, “be in the public interest.”97
Finally, the marketing orders were intended to use
coordination to overcome a host of communication, transportation,
and technological impediments to marketing milk.98 An explicit goal
of legislation was to promote “orderly marketing” of products.99
Further, dairy legislation was drafted in the context of rural
poverty and nutrition concerns during the Great Depression.100 For
example, there was concern that if a large share of dairy operations
went out of production, it would take years to rebuild production
capacity.101 This would lead to price spikes later, once consumer
demand recovered.102 But, such price spikes would harm consumers.
Further, rural poverty (as illustrated by popular literature such as
Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath and by Dorothea Lange’s iconic
photographs of the rural poor for the Farm Security Administration)
was a major macroeconomic problem.103 Then, a large share of the
David L. Baumer et al., Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal
Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183, 185
(1986).
91 Id. at 185 & n.8.
92 Id. at 197 & n.46.
93 See id.
94 Id. at 198.
95 Id. at 196; see Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral
Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831, 831–41 (1989).
96 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 198.
97 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 662–63.
98 See id. at 670.
99 Id. at 662.
100 See id. at 678.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See generally SUSAN LEVINE, SCHOOL LUNCH POLITICS: THE SURPRISING
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S FAVORITE WELFARE PROGRAM 40, 46 (2008).
90
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U.S. population still resided on farms.104 A motivation of providing
milk for the School Lunch Program and dairy products as foreign aid,
aside from supporting farm income, was to improve nutrition of lowincome, vulnerable populations.105
III. The Dairy Industry in the Latter Half of the 20 th
Century
Throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, the dairy
industry and federal dairy policy faced several challenges. While the
USDA intervened significantly to increase dairy prices, these myriad
market interventions often had unintended negative consequences,
which led to a cascade of new interventions (with their own
contradictions).106 Protected from antitrust limits by the CapperVolstead Act, and encouraged by economies of scale, dairies and
marketing cooperatives grew larger and larger.107 Various tactics by
large cooperatives to increase their market power led to greater
Justice Department scrutiny and initiatives to limit what was
characterized as their anti-competitive behavior.108 This has raised
various legal questions about the appropriate limits of cooperative
and marketing order behavior under Capper-Volstead.109 Finally,
programs to “dispose of” surplus milk via foreign aid and federal
nutrition programs sought to simultaneously (a) raise farm income
and (b) improve nutrition of the economically vulnerable.110 Some
commentators began to question whether the farm income support
goal of these programs was promoted at the expense of nutrition and
anti-poverty goals.111
A. Difficulties Maintaining Federal Price Supports
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANALYZING THE SMALL
CITY AND RURAL MARKET AREA 3 (1933).
105 LEVINE, supra note 99, at 46.
106 Id. at 46; E. Dale Odom, Associated Milk Producers, Incorporated: Testing the
Limits of Capper-Volstead, 59 AGRIC. HIST. 40, 46 nn. 10–11 (1985).
107 See Odom, supra note 102, at 47–48.
108 Id. at 50.
109 Id. at 52–53.
110 LEVINE, supra note 99, at 46.
111 J. Amy Dillard, Sloppy Joe, Slop, Sloppy Joe: How USDA Commodities
Dumping Ruined the National School Lunch Program, 87 OR. L. REV. 221, 223
(2008); Michael T. Belongia, The Dairy Price Support Program: A Study of
Misdirected Economic Incentives, 66 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 5, 14 (1984);
see Michael Correll, Getting Fat on Government Cheese: The Connection Between
Social Welfare Participation, Gender, and Obesity in America, 18 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, 46 (2010).
104
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The Agriculture Act of 1949 established the Milk Price
Support Program (MPSP).112 Under the MPSP, USDA would
purchase less perishable dairy products, such as cheddar cheese,
nonfat dry milk, and butter at a pre-determined, government set
price.113 USDA would commit to purchasing as much of these
products as the dairy industry could supply at these support prices.114
The law also required the Secretary of Agriculture to set a minimum
price support for fluid milk as well as these manufactured dairy
products.115 Because fluid milk is an input into manufactured dairy
products, government purchases of manufactured products bid up the
price of milk.116 The MPSP did not, however, place any limits on the
quantity of milk that dairies could produce.117
The intention of the program was to take dairy products off
the market in times when prices were low and then make them
available when prices recovered.118 The government sent nonfat dry
milk abroad as food aid through Food for Peace programs.119 Some
cheddar cheese and butter was distributed to the School Lunch
Program, by other federal nutrition programs, by Veterans
Administration hospitals, and by federal prisons.120 The rest was
stored in warehouses or underground caverns. 121
The post-World War II period saw a series of technological
innovations that reduced the costs of dairy production.122 In the
1950s, producers began adopting antibiotics and sulfa drugs to
combat mastitis and other diseases.123 This increased milk production
per cow.124 The use of mathematical linear programming techniques
allowed researchers to develop least-cost feed rations.125 Use of
mainframe computers in the 1960s made it easier for feed companies
Katherine Lacy et al., Government Cheese: A Case Study of Price Supports, 2
APPLIED ECON. TEACHING RESOURCES 14, 17 (2020).
113 Id.
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO-42-823, CONSEQUENCES OF DAIRY PRICE
SUPPORT POLICY 15 (1979).
117 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 17; see Jeffrey LaFrance & Harry de Gorter,
Regulation in a Dynamic Market: The U.S. Dairy Industry, 67 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
821, 821–32 (1985).
118 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 112, at 22–24.
119 See Seth King, Dairy Support Prices to Increase on April 1, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1978, at 19.
120 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20.
121 See id.
122 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 10-11
123 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4.
124 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4.
125 See I. Katzman, Solving Feed Problems Through Linear Programming, 28 J.
FARM ECON. 420, 420 (1956).
112
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and Cooperative Extension to quickly develop and disseminate
information about these least-cost rations.126 By the late 1970s,
artificial insemination was wide used for dairy cow breeding.127
These innovations all acted to push down costs and increase supplies
of dairy products.128 These growing supplies made it more difficult
for the government to support prices above market levels.129
Government price supports were trimmed in the Nixon and
Ford administrations under the tenure of Secretary of Agriculture,
Earl Butz.130 In attempts to control inflation in the early 1970s, the
Nixon Administration relaxed certain dairy product import quotas.131
Increased imports and expansion of domestic production led to
subsequent price collapses.132 In response, farmers lobbied Congress
and pushed 1976 presidential candidates for more government
support.133 Newly-elected President Carter signed the Food and
Agricultural Act of 1977, which increased the milk support price by
11% in 1978 and another 14% in 1979.134
With guaranteed higher prices, dairy production expanded,
inducing the USDA to stockpile even more products to support
prices.135 Each year, though, dairies had an economic incentive to
over-produce, which only increased government acquisitions further
to support prices.136 Dairies produced 10% more milk per year than
the private market demanded at support prices.137 From 1977 to 1981
alone, the USDA bought up and stored more than 560 million pounds
of cheddar cheese alone.138 Government dairy program spending rose
above $2 billion per year.139 By 1981, government stocks of dairy
products were growing by 20 million pounds per week.140 The
Reagan Administration attempted to reign in dairy program spending
See generally id.
Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 5.
128 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4-5, 10.
129 Katherine Lacy et al., Government Cheese: A Case Study of Price Supports, 2
APPLIED ECON. TEACHING RESOURCES 14, 17 (2020). de Goiter, H., Nielson, D. J.,
& Rausser, G. C. (1995). The determination of technology and commodity policy
in the US dairy industry. In GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy of
Policy Reform (pp. 253-274). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
130 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 11–12.
131 Id. at 12.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 19.
134 See id. at 12.
135 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 18.
136 See id. at 17–22.
137 See id. at 21.
138 See id. at 14.
139 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20.
140 Associated Press, A Big Dairy Surplus Grows, So Do U.S. Wishes to Shed It,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1981, at 74; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20.
126
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and accumulation of dairy product stocks, without much success
initially.141 The 1981 Agriculture and Food Act, slowed the rate of
support price increases. 142 The Administration authorized the release
of what became known as “government cheese” – stockpiled cheese
distributed to low-income people via food banks, food pantries, and
other non-profit organizations.143 Yet, because dairies could sell to
the government at high prices, supply continued to expand as
producers adopted output-expanding technologies and practices.144
Stocks continued to accumulate.145
The 1983 Dairy Production Stabilization Act established the
Milk Diversion Program (MDP) to control the supply of milk.146 The
federal government offered dairy farmers $10-per-hundredweight to
reduce their sales below their historical production.147 More than 2
billion pounds of these reductions, however, were only “air” as many
producers had already reduced their production prior to signing
contracts.148 Thus, a significant portion of program funds went to
producers who were planning to reduce their production anyway.
There was further slippage as dairy producers who did not sign up
for the MDP increased their production.149 Total U.S. milk
production increased to record levels, again triggering even more
government dairy purchases.150
The Dairy Production Stabilization Act did, however, set in
place reductions in the support price.151 The USDA also instituted the
Dairy Termination Program (DTP) to control supplies.152 Under the
DTP, the federal government bought out entire dairy herds, with
farmers committing to forego dairying for five years.153 The
government slaughtered or exported animals from purchased
herds.154 Operating from April, 1986 to September 1987, the program
cost more than $1.8 billion, 155 with more than 1.4 million animal
See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20–21.
Id. at 21; see ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13.
143 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 21.
144 See Associated Press, Surplus Cheese Goes to Poor as President Signs Farm
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1981, at 12.
145 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 21.
146 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 14.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 15.
153 Id.
154 HARRY KAISER & ANDREW NOVAKOVIC, RESULTS OF THE DAIRY TERMINATION
PROGRAM AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK MILK PRODUCTION 1 (Cornell Univ.
Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Ser. No. A.E. Ext. 86-20, 1986).
155 Id.
141
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slaughtered.156 Originally authorized under the Food Security Act of
1985,157 the Dairy Export Incentive Program provided subsidies to
exporters shipping dairy products abroad.158 The Dairy Production
Stabilization Act159 also created the National Dairy Board (NDB),
which from 1984 to 1987 spent more than $100 million in television
and radio advertising to promote dairy products.160 There is some
evidence that the advertising and promotional programs succeeded in
increasing the demand for milk.161 Through this combination of
reduced price supports, export subsidies, increased demand via
advertising, and animal slaughter, dairy over-supply problems began
to ebb.162 USDA stocks of dairy products began to fall steadily starting
in 1984.163
Since the late 1980s, structural and technological change in
the U.S. industry has dramatically reduced the cost of U.S.
production.164 This had the effect of making U.S. products more
competitive on global markets.165 The early 1980s were
characterized by U.S. export subsidies and tight import restrictions
keeping competing products out of U.S. markets.166 As U.S.
production became more competitive, world prices rather than
government support prices served as a price floor for U.S. dairy
commodities.167 By the 1990s, government support prices were
rarely in effect.168 The 2014 Farm Bill (Agricultural Act of 2014)
eliminated price supports and export subsidies altogether.169 The
U.S. still has what Sumner has called a “mind-boggling array of TRQ
regulations.”170 TRQs (tariff rate quotas) essentially act as import
quotas, and the United States still maintains many of these for dairy
products.171 Yet, Sumner has assessed these have relatively little
John M. Marsh, The Effects of the Dairy Termination Program on Live Cattle
and Wholesale Beef Prices, 70 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 919, 919 (1998).
157 15 U.S.C. § 713a-14 (1985) (repealed 2014).
158 Id.
159 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501–14.
160 Id.; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 9.
161 Ronald W. Ward & Bruce L. Dixon, Effectiveness of Fluid Milk Advertising
since the Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1983, 71 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 730,
738–39 (1989).
162 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 9.
163 Id. at 6 fig.5, 9.
164 J. CESSNA ET AL., GROWTH OF U.S. DAIRY EXPORTS: REPORT FROM THE
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE 10 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv. Ser. No.
LDPM-270-01, 2016); see SUMNER, supra note 10, at 1, 7–9.
165 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 9.
166 Id. at 8.
167 See id. at 9–10.
168 Id. at 9.
169 Id. at 16.
170 Id. at 10.
171 Id.
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effect, favoring a few companies, but with little effects on larger
markets.172
Two major remaining components of U.S. dairy policy are
the Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) and a relatively new
Margin Protection Program (MPP), which, on the surface, operates
as a revenue insurance program.173 Producers can take out (highly
subsidized) insurance policies that protect them when the price of
animal feed rises relative to milk prices.174 Like US crop insurance
programs, payments can be more than actuarially fair.175 In other
words, indemnity payments can regularly exceed payment premiums
(i.e., some can regularly make money from their insurance).176 Similar
to crop insurance, when MPP constitutes essentially a disguised
federal income payment. In cases where signing up does not provide
producers such assured returns, producers have either not signed up at
all or have signed up at the minimum level of coverage, which requires
zero premiums.177
B. Nutrition Programs
The distribution of government-purchased dairy products as
domestic or international food aid dates back to the AAA of 1935.178
Surplus dairy products were distributed under the School Lunch
Programs, first established in 1935.179 The Agricultural Act of 1954
established the Special School Milk Program to use USDA funds to
increase fluid milk consumption in schools.180 The program was
extended in 1956 to include “nonprofit summer camps, orphanages, and
other child-care institutions.”181 The national Food Stamp Program was
approved and made part of permanent agricultural legislation in 1964.182
Implementation of USDA nutrition programs have not been without
Id. at 5, 10.
Id. at 3.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 18–19.
176 See id.
177 Id. at 17–18.
178 Agricultural Adjustment Act Amendment of 1935, ch. 641, 48 Stat. 750 (1935);
see Daniel A. Sumner & Joseph V. Balagtas, United States’ Agricultural Systems:
An Overview of U.S. Dairy Policy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DAIRY SCIENCES 20, 20–
25 (H. Roginski et al. eds., 2002).
179 HERMAN M. SOUTHWORTH & MAXWELL I. KLAYMAN, THE SCHOOL L UNCH
PROGRAM AND AGRICULTURAL SURPLUS DISPOSAL 1–2 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Misc.
Pub. No. 467, 1941).
180 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 15.
181 SMITH & ROTH, supra note 22, at 75.
182 MILTON C. HALLBERG, POLICY FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: CHOICES AND
CONSEQUENCES 316 (1992).
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controversy.183 Programs have been tasked with achieving multiple
goals, disposing of government purchased surpluses, increasing
demand for competing commodities (and pleasing competing
commodity groups), and improving nutrition of low income or other
target populations.184 Controversies have arisen when farm income
support and nutrition objectives have not coincided.185 Some critics
have argued that the farm income support objectives have taken
precedent over nutrition goals.186
C. Challenges to Capper-Volstead Exemptions
Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) increase dairy
producer incomes through price discrimination.187 FMMOs divide the
country into geographic regions.188 There have been as many as 42,
but that has been reduced to 11.189 Milk and dairy product processors
in each region are required to pay farmers at least a minimum price for
four classes of milk defined by the Federal government.190 Class I is
the milk used for fluid beverage products.191 The price of fluid milk is
relatively inelastic – the quantity that consumers demand changes little
relative to changes in the price of milk.192 Conversely, if the quantity
available of milk falls, the price increases more proportionally than the
quantity reduction.193 So, limiting supplies increases sales revenues.
Demand for fluid milk is inelastic because it is highly perishable and
expensive to transport, so fluid milk in a particular area faces little
competition from outlying areas.194 Demand for manufactured milk
products (e.g. cheese, butter) can be stored longer and transported less
expensively.195 These products face more regional and even global
Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; see LEVINE, supra note 99, at 68, 108–09,
130.
184 See generally SUMNER, supra note 10.
185 Correll, supra note 107, at 62–65; Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; see
LEVINE, supra note 99, at 68, 108–09, 130.
186 Correll, supra note 107, at 62–65; Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; Belongia,
supra note 107, at 9.
187 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 12.
188 Id. at 11.
189 Hayley H. Chouinard et al., Milk Marketing Order Winners and Losers, 32
APPLIED ECON. PERSP. & POL’Y 59, 59–60 (2010). US Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Office of Budget & Program Analysis. 2020 USDA Budget Explanatory
Notes. Agricultural Marketing Service. At 21-9.
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/21ams2020notes.pdf (accessed
12/8/2020)
190 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 12.
191 Id. at 13.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 21.
194 Id. at 21–22.
195 Richard A. Ippolito & Robert T. Masson, The Social Cost of Government
Regulation of Milk, 21 J. L. & ECON. 33, 56 (1978); Masson & Eisenstat, supra
note 6, at 670.
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price competition.196 Because of this, demand for these products is
more price elastic.197 Changes in the amount supplied have a relatively
small impact on the price producers receive.198
Marketing orders increase producer income by setting a high
price for fluid milk and reducing its supply below competitive
levels.199 At the same time production is shunted toward
manufactured products.200 As output of manufactured products
increases, their prices fall only a little bit. 201 When the supply of fluid
milk is reduced, though, its price rises a lot. 202 Dairy producers
receive a blend price that is a weighted average of fluid milk and
manufactured dairy product prices.203 Compared to a competitive
market outcome, more milk is produced overall, but less actually is
sold as fluid milk, while more is sold in the form of manufactured
products.204 How individual consumers are affected overall by the
price changes depends on their relative expenditures on fluid milk
versus processed dairy products.205 Consumers, on the whole, are
made worse off, though, as consumer losses from higher fresh milk
prices outweigh gains from lowered prices of manufactured
products.206
The economic welfare effects of marketing orders depend on
one’s reference point. Gardner (1984) characterized competing views
of U.S. dairy policy.207 One was of “market failure” story, where dairy
policy is designed to counter anti-competitive behavior of milk
processors.208 The Capper Volstead Act was passed at a time when
technological and institutional constraints presented severe problems
for dairy producers.209 In the 1920s on-farm refrigeration was limited
SUMNER, supra note 10, at 9; see ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 9; see
Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 35–36.
197 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 666.
198 Id. at 667.
199 Robert T. Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, Welfare Impacts of Milk Orders and
the Antitrust Immunities for Cooperatives, 62 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 270, 271 (1980)
[hereinafter Welfare Impacts].
200 Id.
201 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 666 n.17, 667.
202 See id.
203 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 35.
204 Id. at 51.
205 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 688.
206 John E. Kwoka, Jr., Pricing under Federal Milk Market Regulation, 15 ECON.
INQUIRY 367, 380 (1977).
207 Bruce L. Gardner, Price Discrimination or Price Stabilization: Debating with
Models of U.S. Dairy Policy, 66 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 763, 763 (1984) [hereinafter
Price Discrimination].
208 Id.; Gardner, supra note 77, at 92.
209 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 204; see Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at
669.
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as was transportation infrastructure.210 Dairies were captive to a small
number of buyers in the nearest urban centers to their farms.211 Dairies
marketed their wares individually and so had little bargaining
power.212 In contrast, handlers had great scope to exert monopsony
power.213 Capper Volstead allowed dairies to organize to set prices,
but the intent was to countervail monopsony power.214 The
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 and subsequent legislation
supported formation of milk marketing orders and marketing
cooperatives.215 At the time, dairy production was small-scale and
marketing largely uncoordinated.216
A competing perspective was one of “capture” where dairy
producers were able to influence USDA policy to their benefit at
consumer and taxpayer expense.217 As dairy marketing became more
consolidated, sentiment, particularly by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice began to shift toward the
capture perspective.218 In the post-World War II era, technological
and institutional change fundamentally altered how dairy products
were marketed.219 First, improvements in roads, refrigeration, and
shipping technology meant that dairies could sell their product to
more distant markets, lessening the need to only sell to the most local
processors.220
Also, dairy marketing cooperatives began to
consolidate, increasing their geographic scope and market power.221
The large cooperative, American Milk Producers Incorporated
(AMPI) formed in 1969 out of several mergers of smaller
cooperatives in 1967.222 Over the next three years AMPI merged with
54 more cooperatives223 until it stretched from Texas to the Canadian
Border.224 By the mid-1970s, AMPI produced about one eighth of all
milk sold in the United States and had become the largest cheese
producer in the world.225 Around this time, two other large
cooperatives were formed via merger: Mid-America Dairymen
(Mid-Am) and Dairyman, Inc. (DI).226 In many markets, AMPI, MidMasson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670.
ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1.
212 Id. at 2.
213 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 34.
214 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 193.
215 Id. at 206; see Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 37.
216 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 669–70.
217 Price Discrimination, supra note 199, at 763.
218 See Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 204; see Kwoka, supra note 198, at 380.
219 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 9; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 9.
220 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 9.
221 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220.
222 Welfare Impacts, supra note 191, at 275..
223 Id.
224 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220.
225 Odom, supra note 102, at 44.
226 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220.
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Am or DI controlled 90% or more of all raw milk sales.227 By 1982,
these three cooperatives, along with Land O’Lakes were all Fortune
500 companies.228
Justice Department economists began to argue that actions
of the larger cooperatives went beyond just countervailing the
market power of milk purchasers.229 They argued that the largest
cooperatives were exercising supervailing power.230 While
countervailing power would lead to greater milk sales (and lower
prices) to consumers, the exercise of supervailing power was meant
to increase cooperative profits at the expense of consumers, raising
prices above competitive levels.231 Economists at the Federal Trade
Commission and Justice Department conducted econometric market
studies estimating the effects of cooperative behavior on prices and
consumer welfare.232 Kwoka estimated that marketing orders raised
milk prices 7-15% above competitive levels and created a
deadweight loss to the economy of $55 to $180 million per year.233
Ippolito and Masson estimated that U.S. milk marketing orders, by
increasing fluid milk prices, transferred $210 million from
consumers to producers.234 Masson and Eisenstat estimated that
U.S. dairy cooperatives succeeded in raising retail fluid milk prices
by $0.07 -$0.10 per gallon, costing consumers of $71 million per
year from 1967-1975.235
In addition to such studies, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
also began to take a more aggressive stance to reign in what was
perceived as excessive anticompetitive behavior.236 The DOJ sued
the three large cooperatives, AMPI, Mid-Am and DI in 1972.237
DOJ alleged the cooperatives engaged in “predatory pricing, price
squeezes, and foreclosure of nonmembers from customers through
contracts and mergers with nonfarmer milk processors.”238 DOJ
signed a consent decree with AMPI in 1975 and one with Mid-Am
in 1977.239 In the AMPI consent decree, AMPI did not admit to any
wrongdoing, but agreed to desist from specific "predatory and
Id.
Id. at 184 & n.1.
229 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 662, 670.
230 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 185.
231 Id. at 198–201.
232 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, passim; Kwoka, supra note 198, passim.
233 Kwoka, supra note 198, at 380.
234 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 37.
235 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 668 n.22.
236 Ananth N. Madhavan et al., Cooperation for Monopolization? An Empirical
Analysis of Cartelization, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT.161, 161–75 (1994).
237 Id. at 163.
238 Id.
239 Id.
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exclusionary" practices.240 AMPI also lost that part of the major
private case charging conspiracy to monopolize.241 In 1976, the suit
against DI went to trial in 1976 and was eventually resolved in 1985,
partially in the DOJ's favor.242 Studies found that after the consent
decrees, cooperatives were less able to exercise market power to push
fluid milk prices significantly above minimum government support
prices.243 In other cases, courts have ruled that cooperatives
attempting to further monopoly power by acquiring investor-owned
firms, engaging in predatory practices, or forming joint ventures with
non-cooperative businesses are not protected by Capper Volstead
exemptions and are subject to prosecution under the Sherman
Antitrust Act.244
IV. The U.S. Dairy Landscape Today
Dairy production is important to US farm and food systems.
In 2018, the United States produced more than 200 billion pounds of
milk, 13 billion pounds of cheese, 840 million gallons of ice cream,
and 50 million gallons of frozen yogurt.245 Dairy farming, product
processing, and wholesaling employed more than 290,000 workers,
who received more than $15 billion in wages in 2018.246 According
to the most recent, 2017 Census of Agriculture, farms sold nearly $37
billion of milk, accounting for about 9% of total U.S. farm sales.247
U.S. households spend roughly $8 per week on dairy products on
average, with spending ranging from $4 per week for low income
households to nearly $12 per week for high income ones.248
Households with lower incomes, children, or both tend to have a
higher share of dairy spending in the form of fresh milk.249
Id. at 164 n.17.
Id.
242 Id. at 163.
243 Id. at 164 n.18, 174.
244 Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. U.S., 362 U.S. 458, 471–72
(1960); U.S. v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 203–07 (1939); U.S. v. Maryland Coop. Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151, 154–55 (D.D.C. 1956).
245 Quick Stats, supra note 1.
246 Quarterly Census of Employment Wages, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/cew/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
247 NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ACH17-4, 2017
CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: DAIRY CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION 1
(2019),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_DairyCattle
_and_Milk_Production.pdf.
248 M. SWEITZER ET AL., F OOD-AT-H OME EXPENDITURES: COMPARING COMMERCIAL
HOUSEHOLD SCANNER DATA FROM IRI AND GOVERNMENT SURVEY DATA 16 (U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., TB-1946, 2017).
249 Id. at 32, 34; Chouinard et al., supra note 181, at 74.
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Milk production is characterized by concentration regionally
and across operations.250 Five states – California, Wisconsin, Idaho,
New York, and Texas – account for more than half of all U.S. milk
production.251 The top eight states (adding Michigan, Pennsylvania,
and Minnesota) account for two-thirds.252 In 2017, there were more
than 9.5 million milk cows on more than 54,000 U.S. farm
operations.253 About 15,000 operations had no milk sales.254 These
were comprised almost entirely of operations with herds of 19 or
fewer cows.255 Of farms that did have sales, those with herds of fewer
than 100 cows accounted for nearly two-thirds of operations, but only
11% of sales.256 In contrast, just 5% of farms had dairy herds of 1,000
or more cows, but these farms accounted for more than half of all
milk sales.257 About 84% of milk sold in the United States is
marketed by dairy farmer-owned cooperatives.258 The four largest of
these – Dairy Farmers of America, Land O’Lakes, Dairy Farmers
Incorporated, and Darigold Inc. – market about 40% of all U.S.
milk.259
From 1980 to 2018, the total U.S. dairy herd size has
declined about 12%, but milk produced per cow has more than
doubled.260 The average number of milk cows per farm with cows
rose from about 50 in the 1987 Census of Agriculture to about 175 in
the 2017 Census.261 Another measure of dairy scale is the midpoint
herd size – the size for which half of all milk cows are in herds of
that size or larger.262 This midpoint has risen from 80 cows in 1987
to 900 cows in 2012, and to more than 1,000 cows by 2017.263
The United States has become a major exporter of some
dairy products, especially dry milk powder, while still being a
significant importer of others, particularly cheese.264 From 2004 to
2014, U.S. dairy product exports more than quadrupled.265 Overall,
NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 239, at 1–2.
Id.
252 Id.
253 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., AC-17-A-51, 2017
CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 7 tbl.1 (2019) [hereinafter 2017 CENSUS].
254 Id. at 23 tbl.17.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 6; Quick Stats, supra note 1.
261 2017 CENSUS, supra note 245, at 7 tbl.1.
262 ROBERTO MOSHEIM ET AL., CHANGING STRUCTURE, FINANCIAL RISKS, AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR THE U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY 7 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Econ. Research Serv., Rep. No. 205, 2016).
263 Id. at 7–8; Quick Stats, supra note 1.
264 CESSNA ET AL., supra note 156, at 22.
265 Id. at 1.
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the United State is the third largest global exporter of dairy products,
following New Zealand and the European Union (EU).266
What can we glean from this dizzying array of dairy facts and
figures? First, the U.S. dairy industry remains a central part of U.S.
agriculture, while dairy products remain an important part of consumer
diets. It is a technologically dynamic sector, demonstrating impressive
and sustained productivity growth. A driving factor behind this growth
are scale economies that have allowed producers to lower average
costs by increasing operation size.267 Today, the U.S. dairy industry is
dominated by large-scale operations, with marketing dominated by
large-scale marketing cooperatives.268 Productivity growth has made
U.S. dairy production more competitive in international markets.269
This has shifted the U.S. policy stance away from protectionism to a
more outward looking export orientation.270 The United States has
abandoned dairy product export subsidies and moved away from
import controls and tariffs (although this has been incomplete).271
The industry has moved toward less government intervention in
general (although substantial involvement remains).272
A. Technological and Structural Change
Larger dairy farms have been able to take better advantage
of a range of technologies and practices (Table 1).273 Larger
operations make greater use of artificial insemination as well as
services of veterinarians and nutritionists.274 They are also far more
likely to use computers to deliver feed to cattle and for milking. 275
As operations have grown, dairies have relied less on producing their
own feed and raising their own heifers (as replacements) and more
on purchasing them from other operations.276 While smaller
operations produce more of their own feed, larger operations are
more specialized, purchasing it from others.277 Larger farms are also
more likely to enter into forward pricing contracts for inputs
(primarily feed).278 This reduces their risks against unexpected
Id. at 2.
Id. at 10.
268 See id.
269 Id. at 2, 10.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1.
272 Id. at 2.
273 MOSHEIM ET AL., supra note 254, at 16.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 7.
278 Id. at 16.
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increases in feed prices.279 Larger farms can also use their size to
increase their bargaining power, negotiating input prices, rather than
accepting them as given.280
Table 1. Comparison of dairy practice adoption for three different
herd sizes
Herd Size (number of cows)
Practices
<50
200-499
>1,999
Percent of Farms Adopting Practice
Artificial insemination
Routine veterinary service
Nutritionist service
All feed purchased
Most feed purchased
Heifers off-farm
Forward contract inputs
Negotiate for inputs
Computers for feed delivery
Computers for milking
Source: MacDonald et al., 2016281

75
43
59
2
36
1
7
17
1
1

80
89
87
5
54
10
49
63
16
24

Thus, larger farms have split off several functions that
smaller operations still engage in. This has allowed them to greatly
reduce their average production costs (Figure 1).282 One can see
dramatic reductions in production costs as the scale of operation
increases.283 The dramatic shift in the average scale of dairy
operations is not surprising in light of these cost advantages.

Id.
Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 18.
283 Id.
279
280

99
96
95
21
95
31
69
93
69
33
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Figure 1. Average cost per cwt (hundredweight) of milk
produced by herd size
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Source: MacDonald et al., 2016284
A. Dairy Antitrust Issues in the 21st Century
Economists have continued to find evidence of dairy policies
redistributing income from consumers to producers.285 One study
examined effects on different types of households.286 It found that
marketing orders reduced wellbeing for families with young
children, but benefited couples without children.287 This was because
they reduced prices of processed products (such as cheese or yogurt),
but raised prices of fluid milk.288 It also estimated that the program
was more costly to lower income than high income households.289
Another study found that in markets regulated by Federal Milk
Marketing Orders, cooperatives are able to exert market power to
raise the price of milk 9% above marginal cost, transferring more
than $70 million per year from final consumers.290
Dairy cooperative and marketing order activity has continued
to receive antitrust scrutiny.291 In 2010, the DOJ and several states filed
a civil antitrust suit against Dean Foods alleging that its purchase of
processing plants owned by the Wisconsin cooperative, Foremost
Id.
See Chouinard et al., supra note 181, at 59.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 74.
289 Id. at 74–75.
290 Metin Cakir & Joseph V. Balagtas, Estimating Market Power of U.S. Dairy
Cooperatives in the Fluid Milk Market, 94 AM J. AGRIC. ECON. 647, 657 (2012).
291 DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41224, CONSOLIDATION AND
CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY 18–20 (2002).
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Farms, violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.292 DOJ asserted the
acquisition would eliminate price competition from Foremost Farms,
raising milk prices paid by schools, grocery chains, restaurants, and
other retail outlets.293 Various cooperatives have been the defendants in
class action suits, often settling out of court.294
B. Emerging Environmental and Consumer Challenges
As the U.S. population has shifted westward, so has dairy
production, with significant growth in California, Idaho, New
Mexico, and Arizona.295 Western operations also tend to be larger on
average.296 Although U.S. milk production continues to grow, that
production has been concentrated in fewer counties over time.297 In
1969, 71 counties had one-quarter of all dairy cows, while half of all
cows were in 247 counties.298 By 2017, a quarter of U.S. dairy cows
were in just 16 counties (with all but one in the West), while half of
all cows were in just 50 counties.299
This concentration and westward movements present certain
environmental challenges.300 First, this concentrates manure wastes
on a smaller land area.301 As noted above, larger operations have
moved away from feed and forage crop production, which means
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 18.
294 Id. at 19–20; John C. Monica, Jr., Agricultural Antitrust Liability: What about
the Reasonable Farmer, 22 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 2; Jessica Fu, Milk Co-Ops
Slaughtered 500,000 Cows via a “Retirement” Program. Now They’ll Pay $220
Million in a Price-Fixing Lawsuit, THE COUNTER (Dec. 5, 2019, 4:23 PM),
https://thecounter.org/dairy-cooperatives-herd-retirement-cow-slaughter-antitrustprice-fixing-retailer-lawsuit-settlement/; Carol Dumas, National Milk Settles CWT
Lawsuit for $220 Million, CAPITAL PRESS (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.capitalpress.com/ag_sectors/dairy/national-milk-settles-cwt-lawsuitfor-220-million/article_566e01f4-1b6b-11ea-98a1-0b954157be31.html; Melinda
Burton, Not Everything is Settled in the Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America
Antitrust Class Action – The Fight Over Allocating Fees to Class Counsel, FARUKI
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.ficlaw.com/blog/class-actions/archives/noteverything-is-settled-in-the-allen-v-dairy-farmers-of-america-antitrust-classaction-the-fight-over-allocating-fees-to-class-counsel; see Yuliya V. Bolotova,
Agricultural Supply Control: Lessons from the U.S. Dairy and Potato Industries,
CHOICES, 4th Quarter 2015, at 1, 1.
295 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 1.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 23.
298 Id.
299 See NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 239; see 2017 Census Ag Atlas
Maps: Milk Cows – Inventory, NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV.,
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/Online_Resources/Ag_At
las_Maps/17-M209g.php (last modified Feb. 1, 2019).
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there are fewer crop acres where manure might be applied as
fertilizer.302
This excess manure can lead to various types of water and
air pollution.303 Nitrogen and phosphorus from manure can end up in
surface and groundwater.304 One study of public wells in California
found that one in ten of those sampled exceeded the maximum
concentration level (MCL) of nitrate permissible under the Safe
Drinking Water Act.305 Fertilizers on cropland of which dairy manure
was a significant part, were the dominant factor accounting for the
contamination.306 An EPA study of Washington found one in five
sampled wells exceeding the nitrate MCL, with dairy manure again
being a significant contributor.307 This same study also found a group
of dairies in the Yakima Valley were the primary source for
pharmaceutical contamination in the majority of dairy source water
samples.308 Dairy production can also contribute to air pollution in the
form of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
and oxides of nitrogen (NO and NO2), ammonia (NH3), hydrogen
sulfide (H2S), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) as well as
particulate matter.309 Many of these are criteria pollutants regulated
under the U.S. Clean Air Act.310 In addition, Section 304 of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
requires farms to report NH3 and H2S emissions if 45.3 kg or more of
either are emitted in any given 24-hour period.311
In the mid-1970s, EPA established effluent limits for large
feedlots (including dairies) under its Clean Water Act authority.312 In
April 2003, EPA established regulatory requirements for
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).313 After a legal
challenge to the 2003 rule, EPA was remanded to revise some
Id. at 3.
Id. at 23–24; M. A. G. von Keyserlingk et al., Invited Interview: Sustainability
of the US Dairy Industry, 96 J. DAIRY SCI. 5405, 5415 (2013).
304 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 24.
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GROUNDWATER 11, 35 (2012).
306 Id. at 11.
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portions of the regulations.314 The original 2003 regulations required
all CAFOS to apply for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits.315 This designated all CAFOs as point
sources of pollution.316 The revised rule only required CAFOs
discharging (or proposing to discharge animal wastes) into U.S.
water to obtain NPDES permits.317
One potential technology for dealing with dairy wastes are
anaerobic digesters, which use the methane in manure to produce
electricity.318 Methane has 28-36 the global warming potential of
carbon dioxide.319 Adoption of digesters, however, is less than nine
percent on very large operations and nearly nonexistent for smaller
operations.320 Digesters can reduce dairy electricity costs and
potentially be a source of revenue through the sale of excess
electricity.321 Another source of revenue is the sale of carbon offsets,
but markets for such offsets has been slow to develop, with low
prices.322
In California, the dairy industry is a major source of methane
emissions.323 Under Senate Bill 1383, signed into law in 2016,
livestock operations will be required to reduce methane emissions
starting in 2024, with a requirement to reduce emissions by 40% by
2030.324 Using anaerobic digesters to produce electricity in
California can be problematic, though, because the process can
generate other air pollutants.325 Many dairies are already located in
air pollution nonattainment areas regulated by the EPA.326 An
alternative is to use the process to produce pipeline-injectable
renewable natural gas that could potentially be used as transportation
fuel.327 To be economically viable, even large dairies would have to
operate cooperatively to achieve the needed scale economies. The
Id.
Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 29.
319 Nicolas Sanchez & David C. Mays, Effects of Methane Leakage on the
Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Electricity Generation, 133 CLIMATE CHANGE 169,
172, 176 (2015).
320 NIGEL KEY & STACY S NEERINGER, CARBON PRICES AND THE A DOPTION OF
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Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 16, 2011).
321 Id. at 1.
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California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) Program has a
tradable credit system that allows to producers of eligible low-carbon
transportation fuels to sell emission reduction credits. 328 In
December 2015, the California Air Resources Board announced it
would allow LCFS credits for vehicle fuel produced from biogas that
counts toward avoided dairy methane emissions.329 Lee and Sumner
warn however that the viability of dairy production of biogas for
vehicles depends on a raft of assumptions about future regulations
and incentives facing transportation, air pollution, and energy
production.330
Another resource concern deals with water scarcity. Much
dairy production has expanded in the arid Western United States.331
With limited water supplies and continued population growth, water
scarcity has grown acute.332 Prolonged drought and the potential
lower precipitation under climate change exacerbates this scarcity
problem.333 A future challenge for dairies will be the water
requirements for feed and forage crops needed to support their
herds.334 Such crops like alfalfa and corn silage tend to be relatively
water intensive.335 In the future, dairies may have to rely on feed and
forage from more distant markets.
The dairy industry also faces challenges on the consumer
side.336 US per capita milk consumption has been declining with each
successive generation consuming less fluid milk than the generation
before.337 Increases in cheese and yogurt consumption partially
offsets this downward trend.338 Another challenge to the dairy
industry is the rise of plant-based milks (e.g. soy milk, cashew milk,
Id. at 230.
Id.
330 Id.
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almond milk, rice milk, oat milk, etc.).339 These plant-base products
now represent nearly 7% of the combined animal and plant milk
sales.340 The dairy industry has attempted legal action to prevent
these products from using the term “milk” but, in a set of cases, it has
been turned back (Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co.; Gitson v. Trader
Joe’s Co.; Painter v. Blue Diamond Growers).341 In 2017, Senator
Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin) introduced the Dairy Pride Act,
which would prohibit plant-based products from using terms such as
“milk,” “yogurt” or “cheese” on their labels.342 The bill, however is
“languishing in committee.”343 Interestingly, it has no co-sponsors
from major nut producing states such as California, New Mexico or
Georgia.344 The first two are also major dairy states.345 Neither does
the bill have any Senate cosponsors from major soybean producing
states.346
V. Conclusions
The U.S. dairy industry has transformed itself from one
isolated from world markets and highly dependent on government
programs to an industry more globally and market oriented.347
Impressive productivity growth and industry concentration has made
this possible.348 Yet, such concentration (including geographical
concentration) has certain negative environmental implications.349 A
future challenge facing the industry will be compliance with
environmental laws while navigating changes in global dairy
markets. Increased consolidation of dairy cooperatives has also
brought increasing challenges to the Capper Volstead exemptions for
agricultural cooperatives to antitrust action.350 The rise of plantHAYDEN STEWART AND JERRY CESSNA, LIVESTOCK, DAIRY AND POULTRY
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based milk substitutes and declining per capita U.S. milk
consumption threaten domestic demand.351 Yet, income growth (and
increased demand for dairy products in developing countries)
represents a market opportunity.352
351
352
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